The Trouble With Financial Bubbles

Follow-up on macro-microprudential policies :

Industrial quantities of research, analysis, and debate have been devoted to the causes of the 2008 crisis and its consequences; so it seems odd that senior central bankers are still so sharply divided on the central issue of financial stability. All those days spent in secret conclave in Basel, drinking through the BIS’s legendary wine cellar, have apparently led to no consensus.

→ Project Syndicate

The Macro-Micro Conflict

Crisis, financial policy was dominated by microprudential regulations, the implicit assumption being that a successful micro policy was sufficient to maintain the efficient operation of the financial system, just as a successful anti-inflation policy was all that was required from monetary policy.

The limitations of both approaches became very clear during the Crisis and since then, macro has been a major part of financial policy. However, while the ultimate objectives and implementation tools of macro and micro are closely aligned, their intermediate objectives are not, setting the scene for conflict.

→ VoxEu

Regulators Bring a Strange Spoofing Case

When spoofing isn’t really spoofing :

One possibility is that Oystacher saw that the market didn’t look especially weak, and switched to being a buyer instead, betting that the price would go up. This story would not be about spoofing; it would be the opposite. In this story, Oystacher put in a big sell order, and then switched to being a buyer not because he saw tons of other sellers come in behind him, but because he saw so few sellers come in behind him (and so few buyers clear out in front of him). There weren’t that many sellers at the current offer (other than him), and there were a lot of buyers at the current bid, so he figured the price would go up.

→ Bloomberg View

How Much Money Does the 1% Have Hidden in Tax Havens?

Hard to tell how much, but according to Gabriel Zucman, the combined increased of tax havens is 25% since 2009 — when countries of the G20 held a summit in London and decreed the “end of banking secrecy.”

Accepting the status quo seems irresponsible. Each country has the right to choose its forms of taxation.But when Luxembourg offers tailored tax deals to multi-national companies, when the British Virgin Islands enables money launderers to create anonymous companies for a penny, when Switzerland keeps the wealth of corrupt elites out of sight in its coffers, they all steal the revenue of foreign nations. And they all win—fees, domestic activity, sometimes great influence on the international stage—while the rest of us lose. In the end, the taxes that are evaded have to be compensated for by higher taxes on the law-abiding, often middle-class households in the United States, Europe, and developing countries.

→ Naked Capitalism

Inflation Targeting And Expectations

Anchored expectations should be such that one perceives little risk of either high or low inflation in the future. Hence, the range of possible outcomes for inflation considered realistic by agents should be quite limited if expectations are well anchored, and their confidence in their forecasts should therefore be relatively high. To quantify this notion, we assessed the degree of uncertainty in New Zealand firms’ forecasts by asking managers to assign probabilities to a range of possible inflation outcomes. Using these distributions, we computed the standard deviation of each manager’s forecast. The average standard deviation is 2%, implying that firm managers have a lot of uncertainty around their forecasts. Furthermore, there is considerable heterogeneity in the degree of uncertainty associated with individuals’ forecasts.

→ VoxEu