“Making money is art,” Andy Warhol once wrote :
Another reason for advisers’ hesitance is the unique due diligence skillset that art fund investments require. Investors must evaluate the fund’s financial structure and its investment potential. Wealth managers can readily grasp the finance projections, but few are equipped to gauge the fund manager’s art market expertise, proposed acquisition market or strategy for buying and selling profitably, Beard notes.
A short and informative recollection of what happened roughly three decades ago, from Barry Ritholtz :
Where were you on Monday, Oct. 19, 1987?
Today is the first time since 2009 that Oct. 19 has fallen on a Monday, and that has me thinking about that day. I recall exactly where I was — in graduate school, walking between classes, when I passed a television broadcasting the collapse.
New York Magazine had a great piece too on February 2008 :
It all started, of course, on Wall Street. On Black Monday, October 19, 1987, the Dow Jones index, for reasons still being debated, fell 508 points, almost a quarter of its total. (The current equivalent, for comparison’s sake, would be a 3,200-point loss on one day.) The drop turned out to be a “black swan event,” a weirdly poetic economist’s term meaning, basically, a fluke (though few people remember it, the Dow still eked out a positive finish for the year). Still, the hiccup seemed to foretell the instability to come. Over the next two years, with the economy perceived to be overheating, the Fed repeatedly jacked up interest rates, which made bonds and T-bills sexier than stocks, which triggered an epidemic of unscrupulous bond peddling, which further destabilized the market—leading to a slowdown. (If that all sounds disturbingly like the recent subprime-debt mess, well, that’s because it is. But more on that later.) And a slowdown on Wall Street, which provides over 20 percent of the city’s cash income, spells a slowdown for New York.
Shit happens on the trading floor :
The $6bn trade was processed by a junior member of the bank’s forex sales team in June while his boss was on holiday, said two people familiar with the matter. Instead of processing a net value, the person processed a gross figure. That meant the trade had “too many zeroes”, said one of the people.
The most sweeping way to describe this undertaking is as a demonstration of a new version of capitalism, one that will shift the incentives of financial and business operations to reduce the environmental, social, political, and long-term economic damage being caused by unsustainable commercial excesses. What this means in practical terms is that Gore and his Generation colleagues have done the theoretically impossible: Over the past decade, they have made more money, in the Darwinian competition of international finance, by applying an environmentally conscious model of “sustainable” investing than have most fund managers who were guided by a straight-ahead pursuit of profit at any environmental or social price.
Note : title edited
Many different themes run through Deaton’s work – one of which is an emphasis on the importance of measurement. In his view, data collection and economic theory have become too separated, to the advantage of neither the data collector nor the economic theorist. Collectors need the guidance of theory and analysts need to understand the data they work with. Too often, Deaton says, “what we think we know about the world is dependent on data that may not mean what we think they mean”.
